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IPODS AND PRAIRIE FIRES: DESIGNING LEGAL
REGIMES FOR COMPLEX INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SYSTEMS
Deborah Tusseyt
Abstract
This article suggests that intellectual property works are the
products of complex creative systems and, consequently, designers of
legal regimes for the global information ecosystem can learn useful
lessons from complexity theory. Several lessons can be drawn from
simple analogies to two systems: the iPod music player and the
tallgrass prairie ecosystem. First, good design of legal regimes
requires empirical study of intellectual property systems. Empirical
studies are likely to reveal significant variations among creative
systems and one-size-fits-all laws may fail to optimize creation of
intellectual property works. Second, there is a much wider variation
in design possibilities than the traditional binary choice between
private property and the public domain. Finally, legal regimes must
tolerate certain chaotic elements essential to the sustainability of
intellectual property systems. Such elements keep the systems poised
at the edge of chaos where creativity lies.
t Deborah Tussey is a professor at Oklahoma City University School of Law. She
received a B.A. with Highest Honors from the College of William and Mary, a J.D. from the
University of Virginia School of Law, and a L.L.M. from Harvard Law School. Thanks to Sam
Lupica for his comments on an earlier version of this article. The writing of this article was
supported by a grant from the Kerr Foundation and Law Alumni Fund.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Life is random."
- Advertising slogan for the iPod Shuffle.1
With this slogan, Apple nicely captured the zeitgeist, just as it
has captured the markets for portable playback devices and legal
music downloads. 2 Like much modem advertising, the slogan is
catchy, but misleading. Life is not entirely random and neither is the
Shuffle. Both involve systems that contain certain chaotic elements,
which is to say that unpredictable behavior results from the
aggregation of activities that follow established rules. The iPod, for
example, is a complicated system in which hardware follows a set of
rules dictated by software. The shuffle function builds a little element
of controlled chaos into that system. The iPod "shuffles" the playlist
to provide a pleasant element of unpredictability for the listener. The
iPod's unpredictability is limited by its software and the user's choice
of content but, by intentional design, it mimics real complexity.
Life, by comparison, is truly complex. We experience life,
individually and communally, as a series of interactions among
innumerable complex systems. These systems include the biological
systems that comprise our own bodies and the social, political,
economic, technological, and legal systems in which we participate
throughout our lives. Like the iPod, complex systems follow known
rules of interaction but also contain elements of chaos, a form of
"deterministic randomness" inherent in the workings of the system
itself 3 Unlike the iPod, the chaotic elements in complex systems give
1. See Chris Roper, iPod Shuffle: Life is random, but your digital music doesn 't have to
be, IGN.COM, Apr. 14, 2005, http://gear.ign.com/articles/604/604389pl.html (reviewing the
Shuffle and referencing the ad campaign).
2. As of May 2006, Apple controlled an estimated 80% of the legal download market in
the U.S. See Joshua Chaffin & Kevin Allison, Apple Sets Tune for Pricing of Song Downloads,
FrN. TIMES, May 1, 2006,
http://www.ftcom/cms/s/297eecc2-d934-1 I da-8b06-0000779e2340.html. It controlled an
estimated 78 % of the US market for digital music players and 49% of the market worldwide.
See Eric Bangeman, Digital Music Player Market toDouble in Next Few Years, ARS TECHNICA,
May 2, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060502-6719.html.
3. Chaotic behavior refers to unpredictable behavior, or "deterministic randomness,"
that arises from the aggregation of activities within a deterministic system that obeys established
rules of interaction. See J.B. Ruhl and Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law In Modern
Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and
Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405, 420
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them the ability to evolve in response to changes in their
environments, to self-organize, and to generate entirely new and
unexpected behaviors.4 Even during periods of relative stability,
complex systems change constantly. Over long periods of time,
species evolve or become extinct; markets develop, fluctuate,
disappear; civilizations blossom, stagnate, and die. And, from time to
time, complex systems are certainly subject to truly random, even
catastrophic events. 5 The imperative for complex systems is "adapt or
die." Their innate ability to produce new behaviors in response to
environmental change, which in turn induces change in other complex
systems with which they interact, is critical to their survival.
Most works of intellectual property are created and distributed
through complex systems that must now adapt to a revolution in their
environment as digital technologies replace print technologies.
Digitization and global networks have heightened the "systemness" of
intellectual property production modes and markets, and the laws that
govern them. The reduction of many different kinds of works to bits
transmissible over global networks creates particularly acute
problems for the copyright regime, though similar problems occur in
other regimes.6 These developments have inspired suggestions that
intellectual property systems should be viewed as part of an
"information ecosystem" comparable to the ecosystems found in the
natural environment and that intellectual property law might profit
from the application of concepts developed in environmental law.
7
The goal of proponents of the information ecosystem is sustainable
development of intellectual property that preserves the resources
essential to new creation, provides incentives to creators, and
produces workable legal regimes capable of adapting to new
technologies. 8
(1997). Planetary weather systems, for example, follow known rules of interaction, which
periodically produce unpredictable, destructive emergent properties, like hurricanes or
tornadoes. Such events are recurring products of the systems' own workings and are
distinguishable from truly random catastrophes like asteroid impacts on the planet's surface.
4. See infra Part II for a discussion of the characteristics of complex systems.
5. For example, the collision of a large asteroid with Earth may have caused the
extinction of the dinosaurs at the end of the Cretaceous period. See ROGER LEWIN,
COMPLEXITY: LIFE AT THE EDGE OF CHAOS 76 (1992).
6. See James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?,
47 DUKE L.J. 87, 91-93 (1997).
7. See id at 108-13; Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem,
2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2005).
8. See Yu, supra note 7, at 16.
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Much of the debate in intellectual property circles resuscitates
the traditional philosophic conflict between private property and the
commons and relies on analogies to real property that envision limited
choices between the private enclosure and the public park. 9 An
emerging thread in the debate turns to science, rather than philosophy,
for a new conceptual framework for intellectual property.
Environmental law scholars have employed complexity theory as a
framework for the study of environmental legal regimes.' 0 If the
information system can be compared to an environmental ecosystem,
complexity theory may prove useful as a new theoretical framework
for intellectual property rights in the Information Age. 1
This article suggests that designers of intellectual property
regimes can take several lessons from complexity theory and from
analogies to two systems: a human-designed technological system,
the iPod, and a human-managed ecosystem, the tallgrass prairie. First,
good design of intellectual property regimes requires empirical study
of complex intellectual property systems, just as good prairie
management requires empirical knowledge of particular ecosystems.
Empirical studies are likely to reveal significant variations among
intellectual property systems just as harsh experience revealed
essential variations among different prairie ecosystems.
Consequently, a one-size-fits-all legal regime may fail to optimize
creation of intellectual property works. Second, there is a much wider
range of design choices available than the binary choice between the
private enclosure and the public park. Finally, intellectual property
regimes should be designed, like the iPod, to tolerate but control the
chaotic elements essential to sustainability of intellectual property
systems over the long term - to keep the systems poised at the edge of
chaos where creativity lies.
Part II of this article outlines the characteristics of complex
systems and their relevance to intellectual property systems. Part III
briefly describes the traditional framework of debate between high
9. See. e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 64 (2003) (referring to the binary opposition
between intellectual property and the public domain); Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of
Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV.
129, 146-53 (1998) (outlining the high and low protectionist stances with respect to cyberspace).
10. See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How
to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933
(1997) (applying complexity theory to environmental law)
11. Professor Yu suggests that a complexity approach would avoid the bipolarity of the
current intellectual property debate by capturing interactions among the different components of
intellectual property systems and enabling a holistic analysis. See Yu, supra note 7, at 15-18.
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and low protectionists. In Part IV, I suggest an empirical approach to
intellectual property systems based on principles of systems analysis
and, in Part V, I explore some of the implications such an approach
will have for intellectual property regimes.
II. COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
All complex systems share certain general characteristics. In this
part, I briefly describe those characteristics and their relevance to the
complex systems implicated in the production and distribution of
intellectual property works.
A. Complexity Cliff notes 12
In general terms, complex systems are nonlinear, dynamical
systems 13 that produce emergent behaviors and evolve in response to
changing circumstances. Such systems exist throughout the natural
and socially constructed environments, ranging from ant colonies to
human nations, from weather systems to the emergency management
organizations designed to respond to weather disasters.' 4 Complexity
theory first developed in the sciences, but scholars have applied its
basic tenets to a wide variety of political, economic, technological,
socio-cultural, and legal systems.1 5
12. This is an extremely abbreviated summary of the most general tenets of complexity
theory. For a more extensive treatment, see Deborah Tussey, Music at the Edge of Chaos: A
Complex Systems Perspective on File Sharing, 37 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 147, 151-61 (2006).
13. A system is an aggregation of two or more inter-related, interacting elements or
components that comprise a unified whole. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
1269 (11 th ed. 2003).
14. To name just a few complex systems: the global environment and its constituent
ecosystems; the human body and its constituent systems, such as the brain and other organs, the
nervous and endocrine systems, (all of which are, in themselves, complex systems); economies
and their institutional and individual components. A comprehensive list would include most
aspects of the world as individuals experience it. See ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS:
COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 5-21 (1997) (describing complex systems and
their characteristics); LEWIN, supra note 5, at 9-14 (describing the variety of complex systems
explored by complexity theorists at the Santa Fe Institute and elsewhere).
15. There is considerable overlap between complexity theory and chaos theory, since
complexity theory grew out of chaos theory but expanded beyond it. Both analyze nonlinear,
dynamical systems. In general terms, chaos theorists may focus more on the divergent behaviors
that can result from deterministic rules, while complexity theorists concentrate on the universal
patterns of behavior, including chaotic behavior, displayed by complex systems. See LEWIN,
supra note 5, at 10-13 (discussing the overlap between chaos and complexity). For accounts of
the development of these fields, meant for the lay reader, see also JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS:
MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987); M. MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING
SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER AND CHAOS (1992). For comprehensive discussions of
complexity theory and its application to various systems, see, for example, PER BAK, How
NATURE WORKS: THE SCIENCE OF SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY (1996); STEVEN JOHNSON,
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Complexity theory suggests that all complex systems share
certain characteristics: complex, interconnected structure,' 6 nonlinear
behavior, 17 evolution and co-evolution in a pattern of punctuated
equilibrium,' 8 emergence, and, as a consequence of the preceding
characteristics, long-term unpredictability.' 9 Of these interrelated
traits, emergence and unpredictability are of particular significance to
those who attempt to control the behavior of complex systems
through law.
As part of their long-term evolution, complex systems generate
unexpected system-wide behavioral patterns from the rule-governed
EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE 18-21 (2001);
STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR LAWS OF SELF-
ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY (1995). A number of legal scholars have applied aspects of
chaos and complexity theories to legal theory in general and to specific legal disciplines. See,
e.g., Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
603, 604-05 (2003) (broadcast flag mandates); David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long is
the Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
545, 545-46 (2000) (legal arguments, decision-making, and case citation patterns); David G.
Post & David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailing On Every Continent ": Towards a New Theory of
Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1055-59
(1998) (cyberspace governance); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996) (law and economics); J. B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm
for the Dynamical Law-And-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the
Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 851-61 (1996) (interaction between law and
society); Ruhl, supra note 10 (environmental law).
16. Complex systems are composed of multiple, richly interconnected components.
Economies, for example, contain many institutions such as business associations and regulatory
institutions, as well as many individual actors, such as businesspeople and consumers. As is
typical of complex systems, many of these components nest within each other so that a large
corporation, for example, may be composed of many smaller business units (subsidiaries,
divisions, etc.), which are in turn, composed of individuals. All of these subsystems of the
economy are complex systems which share lines of communication, distribution, etc., through
which information, money, products, and so on, flow throughout the system. See JERVIS, supra
note 14, at 17-21; Ruhl, supra note 10, at 947-49, 962.
17. System behavior is nonlinear in the sense that causes and effects are not proportional.
Such systems frequently contain positive feedback loops that amplify change. Very small causes
may produce very large effects and a single cause may produce multiple effects as change
cascades through the many interconnections in the system. This "chaotic" behavior of nonlinear
systems is typified by sensitivity to initial conditions. Even the slightest change in the conditions
to which the system responds may produce widely different behavior, a trait more commonly
known as the "Butterfly Effect." A butterfly flapping its wings in the Amazon rain forest may,
on one occasion set off a chain of events in the atmosphere that, a month later, produces a
snowstorm in New York; on another occasion, the butterfly's actions may have no effect at all.
See LEWIN, supra note 5, at 11; JERVIS, supra note 14, at 34-39.
18. Complex systems evolve in response to changes in their environments and co-evolve
in response to changes in other systems with which they interact. Over time, such evolution
follows a pattern of punctuated equilibrium in which long periods of gradual adaptation are
interrupted by periods of drastic change. See LEWIN, supra note 5, at 70-72, 100-01.
19. See id. at 11-14.
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interactions of the systems' constituent elements.20 Perhaps the most
well known example of such an emergent pattern is the "invisible
hand" of the free market economy.2' Market economies follow
standard rules of interaction imposed by laws, market practices, and
social norms. According to traditional economics, the collective, self-
interested activities of market actors following those rules, pursued
with no regard for the general good, will nonetheless produce overall
market efficiency as if guided by an invisible hand.22 This emergent
quality of market economies enables them to react to changes in
supply and demand much more efficiently than centrally-controlled
economies such as those of the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR).23
Emergent behaviors result from processes occurring throughout
the system as a whole, in particular by the formation of feedback
loops that intensify certain patterns. Consequently, they cannot be
predicted based on knowledge about individual system components or
the local rules of interaction that they follow.24 Emergent properties
may or may not be normatively desirable from the standpoint of
human beings affected by complex systems. Consequently, we tend to
intervene, through legal regulation as well as other means, with the
intention of controlling the workings of complex systems like markets
or political institutions. Such intervention inevitably produces
unintended consequences as responses to the intervention cascade
through the interrelated processes and components of the system.
In addition, complexity theory suggests that the most robust
systems exhibit a property referred to as self-organized criticality or
positioning at the "edge of chaos." Long-term sustainability of
complex systems hinges on the systems' ability to maintain a state
poised between order and chaos that provides the systems with the
flexibility essential to adapt to changes in the environment. 26 The
20. See id at 12-13.
21. See id. at 13.
22. See ERIC. D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY, AND
THE RADICAL REMAKING OF ECONOMICS 26 (2006).
23. See JERVIS, supra note 14, at 63.
24. See id. at 125-26.
25. See id. at 61-67.
26. The edge of chaos concept was formulated by scientists interested in artificial
intelligence who used computer models of cellular automata, which indicated that the complex
behaviors essential to life and intelligence occur at a state that resembles a phase transition
between a solid and fluid. At this "edge," the system is both stable enough to store information
and evanescent enough to transmit it. The similar concept of self-organizing criticality
2007]
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Gaia hypothesis, for example, suggests that the Earth is a homeostatic
complex system that maintains conditions favorable to life through
self-regulation.2 7
Whether or not one subscribes filly to the Gaia hypothesis, Earth
is obviously a complex system encompassing millions of constituent
complex systems that comprise the planetary environment and life
within it - layer upon layer of interconnected systems interacting with
each other down to the smallest organized particles of matter. The
planet is itself a constituent of larger complex systems extending
through our own solar system to the ends of the universe. All of these
systems constantly evolve, sometimes gradually, sometimes abruptly
as certain developments reach a tipping point or systems are impacted
by truly random catastrophes. Included among the lesser systems co-
evolving in this constantly fluctuating superstructure are the systems
by which intellectual properties are produced and disseminated. Like
all complex systems, intellectual property systems are complicated,
interconnected, and subject to evolutionary change, both gradual and
abrupt.
B. Complex intellectual property systems
Many intellectual properties are produced by complex physical
systems. For example, Apple, the company that created the iTunes
music store as well as the iPod, is certainly a complex system. The
corporation is comprised of many interconnected components;
information, money, and products flow through its interconnections
with many other systems. Apple distributes millions of dollars worth
of valuable copyrighted, trademarked, and patented works, including
sound recordings and the iPod itself. Apple benefits from feedback
loops that return to it millions of dollars in exchange for those
products. Both the corporation and its products have evolved in
response to changes in the social, technological, and economic
environments and its current exuberant growth would have been
unpredictable as little as ten years ago.
The massive networks of the Internet and the physical
distribution chains through which Apple distributes its products are
complex systems.28 The many intellectual properties that flow through
developed in the context of the study of physical systems. Related research suggests that the two
constructs describe equivalent states. See WALDROP, supra note 15, at 292-3 10.
27. See LEWIN, supra note 5, at 108-18 (discussing development of the Gaia hypothesis).
28. Network theory is one subset of complexity theory and applies not only to physical
networks like the infrastructure of the Internet but to social and informational networks. The
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those systems are likewise the product of complex systems like
recording and movie studios. Even works primarily created by
individuals, such as novels or graphic arts, are typically mass-
produced and disseminated through complex distribution systems.
These production and distribution systems operate within the larger
complex systems of national and global economies. Social systems
affect their successes or failures and technological systems provide
the essential infrastructure for their activities. Like all complex
systems, intellectual property systems overlap and interact with each
other, co-evolving over time. Changes in technology systems, for
example, may induce changes in production and distributional
systems, social norms, and laws. A recent case on point: the invention
of file sharing software and the emergence of vast networks of file
sharers have had a dramatic impact on the sound recording industry
and are likely to have similar impacts on other intellectual property
industries in the near future.
29
Like all complex systems, intellectual property systems follow
internal rules established by norms, technological standards, and laws.
These rule sets may themselves form complex conceptual systems. In
the case of legal regimes, the systems are both conceptual and
physical since they involve institutions and human actors as well as
systems of thought. The patent regime, for example, involves
individual or corporate parties to patent proceedings and disputes,
institutions like the Patent and Trademark Office and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and the complicated conceptual
systems of the Patent Act 30 and judicial interpretations thereof.
Similarly, the copyright regime implicates creators, publishers, and
consumers, the Copyright Office, the system of copyright laws and
the courts that interpret them.
Since the intellectual property industries and the legal regimes
governing them are complex systems, over time they are likely to
produce emergent behaviors that may or may not be desirable. Many
of these changes will be difficult or impossible to predict in advance.
Given this unpredictability, one would hope that legislators would
study such systems before imposing new legislative measures, much
as ecologists might study a river system in order to design effective
Internet is a physical network that facilitates many social and informational networks. See
MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS: SMALL WORLDS AND THE GROUNDBREAKING SCIENCE OF
NETWORKS (2002), for a general guide to network theory.
29. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 263-64 (2002).
30. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-130 (2007).
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environmental controls to prevent pollution. Once the workings of a
particular system were understood, a regime could be designed to
move the system toward a self-critical state in which order and chaos,
rights and freedoms, exist in the productive balance that fosters
sustainability. Historically, however, that has not been the approach
taken by legislators or the many other interested parties who debate
the appropriate scope of intellectual property rights. The debate
eschews empirical investigation in favor of philosophical conflict
that, too often, produces a binary discourse whose participants are
forced to choose between opposing positions.
III. THE DEBATE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Participants in the ongoing debate over the scope of intellectual
property rights (IPRs) often analogize intellectual property to real
property. The expansion of intellectual property rights has, for
example, been compared to the English land enclosure movement.3'
The propriety of the analogy from tangible to intangible property is
hotly contested, but is engrained in intellectual property theory
32
perhaps as an attempt to "ground" this esoteric discipline in some
comprehensible reality. Such analogies are thought to offer a guide to
the formulation of appropriate IPRs. The usefulness of the real
property analogy however, has been limited in a discourse almost
entirely focused on the conflict between private ownership and the
commons. 33 Within that framework, private ownership typically refers
to exclusive ownership by individuals or corporate entities.
Interpretations of the commons vary from open public access to
equation of the commons with the "public domain."
34
The phrase "tragedy of the commons" was popularized by
Garrett Hardin, in a work dealing with natural resources and
population control, and describes the argument that resources owned
in common are inevitably subject to overexploitation. 35 The solutions
posited for that tragedy in the real property world were either
31. See Boyle, supra note 9, at 37.
32. See Yu, supra note 7, at 1-5.
33. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92
CAL. L. REv. 1331, 1334 (2004).
34. See Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a
Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 114-15 (2003).
35. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE. 1243, 1243-1248
(1968).
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centralized government control or private property ownership.3 6
Unlike real property, creative works are public goods characterized by
nonrivalrous consumption - they can be consumed by any number of
people without being used up. Consequently, the tragedy of the
intellectual commons does not take the form of overexploitation but
rather of reduced incentives for creation or distribution.3 High
protectionists foresee a tragedy of the commons if intellectual works
are too readily appropriated. They advocate strong intellectual
property rights, a form of private property, as the solution for this
tragedy. Low protectionists note that, unlike real property, intellectual
properties must build on prior works and argue that overprotection of
essential intellectual building blocks may result in underutilization of
resources, the "tragedy of the anticommons." They seek to protect the
public domain by limiting IPRs. 38 Both would probably agree that
legal regimes must achieve some balance between incentives and
public access, but the two camps would strike the balance at different
locations on the spectrum between strong and weak protection. The
producers and consumers actually involved in production and
consumption of intellectual works too often devolve to the all-or-
nothing extremes. Producers demand full compensation for all
potential uses of their works and employ digital rights management
technology to control access; users demand and, with the help of
technology, sometimes achieve almost unlimited free access.3 9
In the context of this debate, the setting of legal entitlements to
favor one form of ownership over another is presumed to bear a linear
cause-effect relationship to production and distribution of intellectual
property resources. That is to say, ownership forms are presumed to
be determinative of good husbandry of the resource. Arguments
derived primarily from the philosophies of John Locke,40 with a
strong gloss of law and economics, are deployed to support this
connection. These theoretical arguments have known limitations. For
36. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 8-14 (1990) (criticizing this binary approach).
37. See Boyle, supra note 9, at 41-42.
38. See Yu, supra note 7, at 9-11; Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, I11. HARV. L. REV. 621, 622 (1998)
(generally defining the tragedy of the anticommons).
39. Producer concerns drove the passage of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act
prohibiting circumvention of digital rights management. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). User
opportunism has been clearly displayed in the controversy over music file sharing. See Ku,
supra note 29.
40. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 315-25
(1988) (discussing the relationship of Locke's view of the common to intellectual property).
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example, pro-commons formulations ignore distributional inequities
in the exploitation of intellectual commons; 4 1  pro-property
formulations slight the importance of shared knowledge and
communal creativity.42 Both approaches fail to recognize the synergy
between private property and the public domain.43 To a considerable
extent, the debate takes the form of armchair philosophy, with little or
no empirical underpinning, and ignores the complexity and variety of
the intellectual property systems involved. Scholars find themselves
largely in one of two opposing camps regardless of the particular
issue - the particular complex system - involved in any given
instance.
A number of scholars have pointed out the unrealistically binary
nature of the dialogue pitting the commons against private ownership
and have suggested an alternative view of intellectual property as part
of an information ecosystem - a complex system - in which
intellectual property rights and the public domain exist in a
complementary, dynamic relationship, rather than an oppositional
relationship.44 This school of thought finds support in studies of
alternative ownership models for real resources such as common-pool
or limited common property resources. These scholars document
situations in which resources are successfully owned and managed in
common by a limited group, which can exclude others from use of the
property.45 Studies also identify situations where public ownership of
certain kinds of property, like public roads, clearly produces the most
efficient utilization of the property - a "comedy of the commons.
46
There may be many models of ownership between the extremes of the
carefully tended field and the open frontier. Such work should teach
two valuable lessons: (1) that a variety of ownership models may be
41. See Chander & Sunder, supra note 33, at 1331, 1335.
42. See Rose, supra note 9, at 140-43.
43. See Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public
Property in
the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 101-02 (2003).
44. See Yu, supra note 7, at 6-8. See also Robert A. Heverley, The Information
Semicommons, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127, 1161-83 (2003) (suggesting that intellectual
property should be viewed and managed as a semi-commons).
45. See Hess & Ostrom, supra note 34, at 112 (describing and analyzing common pool
resources, including meadows and forests, irrigation communities, and fisheries); Rose, supra
note 9, at 132, 139-43 (mentioning commonly owned fisheries, irrigation communities, tribal
culture, tribal land management practices). Community forestry projects in the western United
States currently experiment with similar schemes. See Jim Robbins, Community Forestry Bids to
Preserve Scenic West, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at 21.
46. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711,723 (1986).
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viable if they are attuned to the requirements of the particular system,
and (2) that public policy ought not to be based on generic models or
metaphors without empirical verification. 
To pursue the real property analogy, consider the prairie
ecosystems that once occupied vast expanses in the middle of the
North American continent. For thousands of years, these ecosystems
sustained millions of buffalo, and the Native American tribes
dependent on them, without imposition of any formal system of
property ownership. 48 Europeans slaughtered buffalo and Native
Americans alike and imposed private property ownership. 49 Settlers
farmed the prairie, a method of husbandry that was successful across
wide swaths of the Great Plains, but disastrous in the tallgrass prairie
of the Flint Hills and Osage Hills regions of Kansas and Oklahoma,
where the soil is too rocky and shallow to sustain farming.50
Eventually the land was returned to its natural use - grazing - by
ranchers who came to understand the interdependence between
grasses, far-ranging herds of bovines, and natural fires. Ranchers
mimic with cattle the migratory patterns of the bison herds 51 and, like
the Native Americans before them, use controlled fires to achieve the
beneficial ecosystem effects caused by natural fires.52 The ranchers
learned to manage the prairie within a private property regime; the
Native Americans successfully managed it within a non-property
regime. Sustainable use of the tallgrass prairie depended not on the
particular legal rights granted by the law but on users' respect for the
requirements of each ecosystem. Not all prairies are alike.
Like different prairie ecosystems, different intellectual property
systems may require different methods of husbandry. Some legal
regimes might prove more likely than others to respect the needs of
particular intellectual property systems. To the extent that the choice
of ownership models may have a beneficial impact on sustainability,
there are obviously more choices available than the binary choice
between private property and the commons. How should we make
those choices? We might start by establishing the needs of the
systems, rather than by imposing a top-down regime based on
47. See OSTROM, supra note 36, at 23 (policies based on metaphors can be harmful).
48. See AIMEE LARRABEE & JOHN ALTMAN, LAST STAND OF THE TALLGRASS PRAIRIE
59-64 (2001).
49. Id. at 69.
50. Id. at 99.
51. Id. at 104.
52. Id. at 24.
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unverified assumptions about the systems' responses to legal
intervention.
Intellectual property regimes fairly beg for empirical verification
of the effects of IPRs meant to preserve the balance between
incentives and access. Yet there has been little systematic study of the
effects of such IPRs on the hundreds of intellectual property
industries that they are designed to encourage. There is, indeed,
minimal empirical evidence to support the basic correlation between
the incentives allegedly provided by IPRs and creativity, scientific
advancement, or improved public access. 53 We know little more about
the ecology of intellectual property systems than the settlers knew
about the ecology of the tallgrass prairie. In the absence of actual
evidence, legislators operate by a sort of logical dead reckoning,
heavily influenced by lobbies for the intellectual property industries,
that often proves, in the end, to be faulty.
54
In fairness, the information and tools essential to extensive
empirical investigation have, until recently, been unavailable. The
basic tenets of complexity theory could emerge only after computers
became sufficiently powerful to emulate the behaviors of complex
systems. 55 Similarly, computer and network technologies now enable
intellectual property theorists to put their models to the empirical test.
Complexity theory, systems analysis, and modem computational
power can add useful new elements to the toolkit for analysis of
intellectual property industries and intellectual property regimes.
IV. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD
Complexity theory offers insight into the behaviors of complex
systems. Systems analysis provides the methodology for studying
them. A systems approach requires that observers analyze each
system holistically by defining and evaluating the functionality of the
entire system, rather than reductively by examining only its
components. 56 Since the long-term behaviors of complex systems
emerge from the comprehensive web of connections and interactions
53. See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE 4-5 (1995).
54. Many thought, for example, that without strong IP rights, no valuable content would
ever appear on the Internet. Yet the Internet today offers a vast cornucopia of content, much of
which is both valuable and unprotected.
55. The development of computers powerful enough to create artificial complex systems,
such as cellular automata, or to simulate real systems like the weather, was critical to the
development of complexity theory. See WALDROP, supra note 15, at 63-64.
56. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 481
(1997).
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among all of their components, analysis of individual components is
necessary, but not sufficient, for an understanding of the whole.57
Definition of the scope of the system is particularly critical, since
complex systems tend to overlap and interact with each other. Inputs,
outputs, linkages, processes, and rules of interaction should be
identified and, if possible, quantified. Complexity theorists employ
models to simplify this analysis and many of the central precepts of
complexity theory derive from computer models.58  However,
theoretical models are tested by empirical research into the actual
behavior of complex systems as various as earthquakes and stock
markets. Complexity models are, moreover, avowedly probabilistic in
nature - they are likely to reveal power law distributions 59 rather than
linear, proportional relationships between causes and effects. Such
models recognize the elements of chaos inherent in complex systems.
Since intellectual properties are produced and distributed
through complex systems, general principles of systems analysis
should apply to investigations into the real-world operation of
intellectual property systems and the efficacy of the legal regimes that
govern them. Such systems can be defined, their goals identified, and
an assessment made of whether the systems function to achieve those
goals. Systems analysis might be applied to certain intellectual
property industries, such as the recording industry, to different types
of works, or to distributional networks such as the Internet and related
systems. It might equally be applied to the systems of intellectual
property laws. We have some general idea of the goals of those
regimes - to encourage creativity and "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts," 60 to protect business good will, to
encourage research and development - but very little proof that they
achieve them. Modem statistical techniques for data collection and
analysis permit testing of the assumptions about creativity, incentives,
and dissemination that undergird the legal regimes.61
57. See JERVIS, supra note 14, at 12-13.
58. See WALDROP, supra note 15, at 63-64.
59. A "power law distribution" describes a probabilistic range of responses in which big
responses are rare, small ones are common, and intermediate responses occur at a rate
somewhere in between. Id. at 305-06.
60. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
61. Some empirical studies of IP systems have recently been published or are
forthcoming. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: the
Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677 (2007); Kai-
Lung Hui & Ivan P.L. Prig, On the Supply of Creative Work: Evidence from the Movies, 92 AM.
ECON. REV. 217 (2002); Kai-Lung Hui & Ivan P.L. Prig, On the Supply of Creative Work:
Evidence from the Movies, (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (preliminary
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The systems approach requires recognition that intellectual
property systems involve interdependent, dynamic subsystems and
processes, as well as sets of products, and that successful legal
regimes must address the whole. 62 The investigator's view must
comprehend not just particular markets, but the social networks and
technological systems that surround them. Assessment of the impact
of music file sharing on music production, for example, requires
analysis not only of recording industry receipts but also attention to
social sharing norms and alternative methods of distribution offered
to artists by new technologies. Better understanding of these
interrelationships should produce more coherent theoretical models of
the operation of intellectual property systems. Those models are likely
to be various and differentiated, not merely binary. A single model is
no more likely to apply to all intellectual property systems than a
single complexity model would be likely apply to hurricanes and
tornados or to word processors and artificial intelligence. Researchers
should employ standard scientific methodology in which the
researcher constructs an initial model relying on available knowledge
about the system, tests the model against reality, revises the model
accordingly, and tests the model again. Obviously, such analysis must
be an ongoing process as systems continue to evolve.
In short, a systems approach to intellectual property would
identify differences as well as commonalities among systems, build
theoretical models appropriate to different systems, but also seek
empirical foundations upon which to base legal responses to
evolutionary change within them. If the analogy to real property is
one tool for grounding intellectual property law in real experience,
then surely actual empirical research can only improve upon the
usefulness of such analogies by testing them against reality.
The complexity approach will not be particularly easy. It will
require interdisciplinary cooperation among intellectual property
scholars and collaborators in other disciplines, which may include
economics, business management, statistics, and cognitive science to
name a few. Since intellectual property systems are now, more than
ever before, global in scope, collaboration must be transnational as
well as transdisciplinary. Analysis will take time - one can easily
imagine dozens of researchers devoting entire careers to study of
draft update of the 2002 paper, an attempt to test empirically the effect of extensions in
copyright duration on movie production).
62. See Rose, supra note 9, at 161 (observing that limited common property systems may
require that we look at such systems as sets of activities as well as sets of products).
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particular aspects of intellectual property systems. Good data may be
easier to come by with regard to some systems than others; 63 perfect
information is unlikely to be available even where empirical work is
feasible.6 4 There will inevitably be disputes over the reliability and
interpretation of the data that does exist. 65 Moreover, the systems will
continue to change even as we study them. Nonetheless, modeling
based on some information, however fluid and imperfect, is
preferable to armchair analysis. Theory tested by scientific
methodology is preferable to untested philosophy. Until we undertake
holistic, empirical analysis of intellectual property systems, we can do
no more than guess at the optimal shape for IPRs in the information
ecosystem. Even the best, empirically tested models will be only
probabilistically predictive - they will not offer clear-cut, linear
cause-effect relationships. They will resemble predictions of the path
of a hurricane within a wide zone of uncertainty. That irreducible
uncertainty suggests that legislators approach the design of legal
regimes for intellectual property systems with humility, not hubris.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL REGIMES
This part suggests that effective legal regimes must
accommodate variation, change, and a certain degree of disorderly,
but productive, conduct in intellectual property systems. It also briefly
compares the complexity approach to prevailing theories of
libertarianism and law and economics.
A. Diversity, emergence, and evolution
Empirical study of intellectual property systems is likely to
reveal variations in system dynamics, which have implications for
appropriate legal regulation of those systems. We already recognize
63. There appears to be significant data available regarding the music industry. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT 38-81, 259-62 (2004) (referring to publicly available industry data
throughout).
64. Indeed, industries may attempt to withhold information if they consider secrecy to be
advantageous commercially or politically.
65. Surveys have, for example, reached different conclusions on the effect of file sharing
on sales of sound recordings. Compare Stan J. Liebowitz, Pitfalls in Measuring the Impact of
File-Sharing on the Sound Recording Market, 51 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 439 (2005), available at
http://www.utdallas.edu/-liebowit/intprop/pitfalls.pdf (finding that file sharing adversely
impacts sales), with Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record
Sales:An Empirical Analysis (2004),
http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/FileSharingMarch2004.pdf (finding no statistical correlation
between file sharing and slumps in music sales).
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that copyright systems, for example, require rules different from those
applied to patent systems. Even within a single regime, different
industries may require different approaches. The optimum conditions
for producing and distributing sound recordings may be quite
different from those for producing and distributing movies. The
optimum IPRs for individual works are unlikely to suit communal
works.
The generic theoretical assumptions on which intellectual
property law relies may prove invalid in some systems. The dominant
utilitarian incentives theory presumes a linear cause and effect
relationship between legal entitlements and creativity. Since complex
systems often behave in a nonlinear manner, this is clearly a risky
assumption. Empirical analysis might show that intellectual property
entitlements are necessary to provide incentives in some fields but not
others or that, in some fields, such entitlements are essential to
incentivize distribution, but not creation. Analysis might also provide
more reliable information about the necessary level of incentives. An
inflexible, one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to optimize
66production and distribution in all intellectual property systems.
Legal regimes should take differences among systems into account.
67
As the prairie analogy suggests, it may in fact be possible to
produce sustainable systems under a variety of ownership models so
long as those with ownership or access rights understand and respect
the requirements of the particular creative system. It may also be
desirable to tailor a wider variety of ownership structures to the
requirements of different systems. The Native Americans who were
dispossessed of their lands, for example, might be conferred
communal rights in their traditional cultures.68 It must be borne in
mind that rules other than law, such as social norms and market
practices, will also be in play. Law is merely one of many interacting
complex systems.
66. The one-size fits all approach is already noticeably failing in the marketplace as the
Internet facilitates the development of thousands of niche markets, a phenomenon referred to as
the "long tail" of the sales curve. Dan Mitchell, Tail is Wagging the Internet Dog, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul. 8, 2006, at C5.
67. Intellectual property laws already include some specialized provisions tailored for
particular industries. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 114, 115 (2000) (dealing with sound recordings and
musical works); 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000) (dealing with digital audio recording devices).
68. See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights To Intellectual
Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 178 (2000) (arguing
that a group rights model of ownership of intangible property is necessary to protect the works
of indigenous peoples).
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While systems analysis may reveal divergences between
industries or regimes, complexity theory suggests that it will also
reveal commonalities permitting some application of generalized
legal rules. If all complex systems share common characteristics,
surely intellectual property systems will also present common issues.
Legal solutions developed in one regime may prove beneficial in
another, as the Supreme Court has recognized in recent cases.69 A
complexity perspective is likely to encourage some cross-fertilization
among regimes.
The quality of emergence suggests that regimes should favor
rules reflecting actual practices that emerge within intellectual
property systems rather than impose extensive top-down legal
intervention based on unverified assumptions about system
behavior.70 Given the inherent unpredictability of complex systems,
attempts to use intellectual property law to influence the development
of certain emergent patterns, alter them, or avoid undesirable
emergent effects will provide imperfect solutions at best and will have
unanticipated consequences.7 1 Consequently, legislators must try to
anticipate indirect as well as direct effects of legislative initiatives,
with the understanding that complete predictability and control are
not only unattainable, but also undesirable.
The concept of self-organized criticality suggests that intellectual
property regimes should seek a balance between chaos and order that
will make both the regimes and the industries they govern flexible
69. For example, the Supreme Court has adapted principles of secondary liability
established in patent law to copyright disputes involving new technologies. Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439-42, (1984) (adopting the staple article of
commerce doctrine); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764,
2780 (2005) (adopting inducement standard).
70. This characteristic appears to support, for example, the approach taken by drafters of
the Uniform Commercial Code in basing their legal codification on accepted commercial
practices.
71. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205, for example, was
intended to protect copyrighted works like sound recordings and DVDs, but has generated law
suits seeking to protect monopolies in replacement parts by claiming "circumvention" of
authentication software. See Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (rejecting DMCA claim brought against manufacturer of replacement parts for garage
door openers); Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir.
2004) (rejecting claim of DMCA violation brought by printer manufacturer against
manufacturer of chip used in remanufactured printer cartridges). Attempts to streamline the
patent process may have inadvertently harmed innovation. See Sabra Chartrand, Patents,
N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at C8 (reporting on a study by Professors Josh Lemer and Adam B.
Jaffe showing that simplification of the patent system, intended to encourage innovation,
produced a degradation in the patent review system and increasingly aggressive patent
enforcement, resulting in anti-innovative exploitation of patents for lawsuits).
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enough to adapt to change. Effective regimes should nudge systems
toward desired results rather than imposing heavy-handed strictures.72
The regimes themselves must accommodate indeterminacy and
evolve in response to changes in the wide variety of systems
governed. Here, the prairie and the iPod have lessons to teach
regarding the importance of the chaotic elements found in all complex
systems and the possibility of designing rules that reap the benefits of
those elements.
Prairies have always been subject to periodic fires sparked by
lightning strikes and other natural phenomena.73 Such fires were
chaotic elements within the ecosystem, inevitably recurring though
the exact timing of a particular fire was unpredictable. Fires are
certainly destructive but also essential to the health of the grassland
since they prevent the encroachment of woody plants and increase
productivity by stimulating new growth.74 Cycles of destruction and
re-creation connected to such chaotic elements are common to
complex systems.75 Schumpeter's concept of "creative destruction,"
in which economic processes continually create new economic
structures and destroy old ones,76 provides an economic example
though the phenomenon is hardly limited to economic systems.
Historically, entire civilizations and their economic, social,
technological, and legal systems have been subject to long cycles of
creation and destruction. A process of creative destruction may even
now be remaking copyright industries in response to the digital,
networked environment; the copyright regime must respond.77 It may
be no accident that Thomas Jefferson chose the metaphor of fire to
illustrate the importance of access to ideas and the dangers of
intellectual property monopolies.78 As the prairie analogy indicates,
72. "[Gjovemments should avoid both extremes of coercing a desired outcome or
keeping strict hands off, and instead seek to push the system gently toward favored structures
that can grow and emerge naturally. Not a heavy hand, not an invisible hand, but a nudging
hand." W. Brian Arthur, Complexity and the Economy, 284 SCIENCE 107, 108 (April 2, 1999).
73. See LARRABEE & ALTMAN, supra note 48, at 24.
74. Id.
75. See LEWIN, supra note 5, at 100-01.
76. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 (1976).
77. See Ku, supra note 29, at 269 (suggesting that the music industry is currently
experiencing creative destruction).
78.
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral
and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have
been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like
fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point, and
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however, those who understand the needs of a system may
intentionally control chaotic elements just as Native Americans and
ranchers control fires.79 Prairie managers design a little chaos into
their management of the ecosystem.
Similarly, Apple designs a little chaos into its iPod in the form of
the shuffle function. Shuffle play is hardly essential to a functional
system, so why incorporate it? It obviously offers a market advantage
because users crave the element of surprise, a little bit of
indeterminacy, at least as much as they value predictability.80 Our
success as a species may be a result of our ability to simultaneously
entertain a love of order and a restless desire for change. Of particular
importance to intellectual property, surprise is an essential
characteristic of creativity and one of the reasons that we value
creative works. Great artists offer not merely mastery of past styles
but new visions different from what came before. Great inventors leap
beyond the prior art in their fields.
Cognitive scientists posit that creativity is an emergent quality of
that complex system, the human brain, and occurs when the brain is
poised at the edge of chaos.8' The brain receives innumerable bits of
information from the senses, responds to them, and manipulates
them. Because of the chaotic elements inherent in these complex
processes, the brain sometimes produces output different from any of
its inputs - it creates. Some degree of internal chaos is essential to its
ability to do so. 8 3 The creative brain must also, of course, have access
to resources physical and cultural. It must interact with countless
other complex systems and communicate with other brains both living
and dead through transmitted culture. It requires time and a modicum
of stability in which to play with the information it acquires. In short,
like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of
confinement or exclusive appropriation.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug 13, 1813), in THE COMPLETE
JEFFERSON, 1011, 1015 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943).
79. See LARRABEE & ALTMAN, supra note 48, at 24.
80. The Greek poet, Constantine Cavafy, in his poem Wailing for the Barbarians (1904),
tells the story of an antique town awaiting destruction by the barbarians. The residents are
disappointed when the barbarians move off without taking the town - at least destruction would
have been a change of pace. Constantine Cavafy, Waiting for the Barbarians (1904),
http://users.hol.gr/-barbanis/cavafy/barbarians.html (English translation).
81. Ralph D. Clifford, Random Numbers, Chaos Theory, and Cogitation: A Search for
the Minimal Creativity Standard in Copyright Law, 82 DENV. U. L. REv. 259, 274-79 (2004)
(describing creativity as a result of the complex nature of the brain).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 275-79. Surely the first sign of true artificial intelligence will be a computer
mind that appreciates and generates surprises.
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it requires some balance between order and chaos in its own workings
and in its surrounding environment.
If the overarching goal of intellectual property regimes is to
induce creativity by rewarding it, then a well-designed legal regime,
like a well-designed music player, must accommodate both stability
and an element of controlled chaos. It must nudge intellectual
property systems toward the edge of chaos yet prevent them from
falling over it. Thus far, intellectual property regimes, like most laws,
have concentrated more on providing order, than encouraging change.
The most basic function of law, after all, is to provide predictable
rules for societal interaction and lawyers, by vocational necessity,
take the short view of complex systems. Lawyers prefer set playlists
to the shuffle function. In the long view, however, emergence,
evolution, and chaotic events, will inevitably alter the playing field
and are, in fact, essential to the sustainability of intellectual property
systems. Fire and the shuffle play cannot be avoided.
Intellectual property regimes, along with social norms and
market practices, provide a generally orderly structure within which
intellectual goods can be created and distributed and rights in them
transferred. However, durational limitations84 and exceptions created
by doctrines such as first sale,8 5 and fair use,86 have historically
prevented complete control of all uses of works by IPR owners. In
systems terms, the regimes contain some bright line rules producing
predictable, ordered behaviors,87 and some muddy rules preserving
the chaotic elements essential for adaptation. 88 In the copyright
regime, the historical prevalence of personal uses 89 of copyrighted
84. Copyrights and patents have statutorily limited durations. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305
(2000); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
85. The first sale of a copy of a work or an invention exhausts the copyright or patent
owner's rights in that copy. See, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000) (copyright first sale); Keeler v.
Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 661 (1895) (patent first sale and exhaustion).
86. The fair use doctrine provides a defense against copyright infringement claims. See
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
87. For example, the rules governing formalities like registration and deposit of
copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-412 (2000).
88. If the outcome of application of a legal rule to an entitlement dispute is unpredictable,
the rule is considered "muddy." Such rules typically require the decision maker to balance
competing interests, as courts do in applying the "four-factor" test for fair use. See Dan L. Burk,
Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 130 (1999).
89. Personal use refers to consumptive or adaptive uses of works by consumers for their
own enjoyment and, often, includes sharing with others. It includes a variety of unlicensed uses
of copyrighted works, such as performing musical compositions in family musicales, creating
mix tapes or burning CDs containing customized playlists, copying favorite articles or passages
from books, building fan web sites, and so on. When works existed only in analog forms, such
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works provided an additional outlet for creative re-use of cultural
materials. Indeed, another clever design element of the iPod is the
digital rights management system that permits such uses to persist,
but keeps them within limits. 90 Similarly, designers of intellectual
property regimes should aim for some middle ground between all-
property and no-property rights in creative works, for rules that both
provide stability and anticipate change. The middle ground is where
the edge of chaos, and maximum sustainability, will be found.
Any regime governing inherently unpredictable systems will
inevitably require periodic "tune-ups" to accommodate unforeseen
changes in the system. It will, therefore, be important for regimes to
incorporate, as part of their design, feedback mechanisms for
collection of data on the status of the systems, which data will provide
the basis for responses to changes in the systems. One of the
promising features of the otherwise largely lamentable Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, for example, is the requirement that the
Librarian of Congress review the fair use implications of the act every
three years. 91 Such review mechanisms should be more commonly
employed. Legislators must anticipate a continuing relationship with
intellectual property systems. They cannot expect to set legal regimes
in motion, and then leave them unattended for long periods of time.
B. Not your father's libertarianism
An approach that suggests respect for bottom-up, emergent
solutions and generally cautious interventions might be thought
vaguely libertarian. Not so. Complex systems are historically
contingent and path dependent. The history of intellectual property
systems includes rather significant legal controls, a situation which is
unlikely to change. Moreover, systems have no inherent moral
compass and their emergent properties, while responsive to system
uses posed little threat to IPR owners who grudgingly tolerated them. See Jane C. Ginsburg,
Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 1, 11 (1997). Digitization
enables such activities on an unprecedented scale. Copyright owners respond by demanding
more expansive legal rights and applying technological protection systems to prevent such uses
of their works.
90. Apple's FairPlay program limits, for example, the number of devices on which
downloads can be used and the number of times a playlist can be burned to CD. See William W.
Fisher, Ill et. al., iTunes: How Copyright, Contract, and Technology Shape the Business of
Digital Media - A Case Study, Jun. 15, 2004,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/uploads/81/iTunesWhitePaper0604.pdf (describing Apple's
digital rights management system); Apple iTunes Store Terms of Service,
http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/service.html (last visited July 22, 2007).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(C) (2000).
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conditions, may or may not be normatively desirable. Systems care
nothing for the fate of the individual, but human beings must.
Hurricanes are emergent properties of weather systems, but we seek
methods of ameliorating their destructiveness. Economic systems, left
unregulated, produce monopolies and inequitable distributions of
wealth. We regulate to control abuses. The systems approach outlined
above suggests that intellectual property regimes must permit
emergence because some emergent patterns will be highly beneficial
and efficient, but must also be prepared to control the effects if they
prove undesirable. We can only verify effects through empirical
study. Because of the reliance on empirical work, the complexity
approach cannot be lumped into either the high-protectionist or low-
protectionist camp. Empirical work might well suggest a high-
protectionist strategy for one system, but a low-protectionist strategy
for another. Such an approach bears little resemblance to
libertarianism. Nor does it entirely agree with traditional law and
economics analysis.
To date, the utilitarian focus on economic incentives has tended
to obscure other values inherent in any system involving creative
expression: the importance of artistic diversity and semiotic
democracy. Complexity theory suggests that traditional economic
analysis is necessary, but not sufficient to a complete understanding
of intellectual property systems. It is necessary because it may explain
a significant set of components and processes involved in such
systems. It is insufficient because it focuses only on markets and
ignores other system components such as social norms and networks
and technological development. It thereby commits the cardinal sin,
to a complexity theorist, of reductionism. Some of the assumptions of
traditional equilibrium economics, such as the rationality of economic
actors, are manifestly at odds with reality.92 Cost-benefit analysis
assumes linear cause-effect relationships that may not obtain in
complex systems and have at best limited utility for policymakers
trying to influence outcomes in an uncertain future.93 However,
behavioral economists and game theorists already offer more realistic
views of strategic economic behavior.94 Complexity economists 95 and
92. See BEINHOCKER, supra note 22, at 116-18.
93. Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 3, at 479-81 (criticizing cost-benefit analysis as inaccurate
in determining aggregate costs and benefits because it does not (cannot) account for unexpected
system effects).
94. See Craig Lambert, The Marketplace of Perceptions: Behavioral Economics Explains
Why We Procrastinate, Buy, and Grab Chocolate on the Spur of the Moment, HARV. MAG.,
Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 50.
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ecological economists 96 adopt explicitly evolutionary approaches that
recognize inherent resource limitations in economic systems.
Interdisciplinary teams explore new decision-making methods that
will provide greater flexibility where outcomes are uncertain. 97 These
emerging economic disciplines can contribute important insights into
the operations of intellectual property systems.
A complexity approach by no means forecloses exploration of a
variety of theoretical approaches. However, it does suggest that, taken
singly, traditional approaches may be too limited in scope or too
lacking in empirical verification. No single approach should place
blinders on our ability to study systems holistically. Complexity
theory itself is merely one more tool that may improve our
understanding of the intellectual property systems that produce iPods
and the content loaded onto them. If the complexity approach must be
aligned with any particular philosophy, it may fit most comfortably
into the rather loose collection of concepts known as pragmatism of
which Holmes was the foremost proponent in law. The central core to
pragmatism is its emphasis on making use of a variety of theoretical
ideas but grounding such use in practical effects on real life. 98
Complex systems, like life, resist the imposition of a single unified
theory of everything.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have argued that complexity theory and systems
analysis offer a new and useful analytical approach to the perennial
argument over the proper scope of IPRs. The prairie and the iPod
teach that legislators should design legal regimes with due
95. See, BEINHOCKER, supra note 22, at 15-19 (describing economies as adaptive systems
that evolve in response to technological innovation, social development and business practices).
96. See, HERMAN E. DALY & JOSHUA FARLEY, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES
AND APPLICATIONS xxii-xxiii (2004) (describing an interdisciplinary framework for economics
that recognizes linkages among economic growth, environmental degradation, and social
inequity).
97. See Steven W. Popper, Robert J. Lempert & Stephen C. Bankes, Shaping the Future,
SCI. AM., Apr. 2005, at 67 (describing an alternative decision-making framework that finds,
tests, and implements flexible policies).
98. Holmes rejected a strictly formalist approach to law in favor of an approach
emphasizing the effect of experience, by which he meant the interaction of the human organism
with its environment. LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 342-47 (2002) (describing
Holmes's jurisprudential theories in the context of pragmatism). Interestingly, Justice Breyer has
recently embraced an essentially pragmatic approach to constitutional interpretation. See
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Consent of the Governed, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Feb. 5, 2006, at 20
(reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2006)).
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consideration for the varying requirements of different intellectual
property systems and an appreciation for the chaotic elements
inherent in those systems. Empirical study is essential. The call is
often heard for formulation of a new theory of the commons. I
suggest that we have less immediate need of a new theory of the
commons than of hard data about the workings of intellectual
property systems.
Historically, philosophy served as a means of explaining real
phenomena in the absence of scientific knowledge. As scientific
methodology improved and real data became available, preexisting
philosophies were, perforce, altered or abandoned. Our modern
scientific understanding of the atom, for example, is in no wise
comparable to the imaginings of the Greek atomists. In intellectual
property, the time may be right to put Locke and Hegel on the shelf
for a while and abandon the thin air of pure theory in favor of a more
scientific exploration of the real systems through which intellectual
works are produced and distributed. With that knowledge, we will be
better equipped to formulate new theoretical models and to design
legal regimes that encourage creativity and assure public access to
information. Intellectual property systems will continue to evolve
even as we study them. Well-designed legal regimes must be flexible
and varied enough to gently guide that evolution and continuously
respond to it.
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